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Abstract Security control of Electronic Medical Record
(EMR) is a mechanism used to manage electronic medical
records files and protect sensitive medical records docu-
ment from information leakage. Researches proposed the
Role-Based Access Control(RBAC). However, with the
increasing scale of medical institutions, the access control
behavior is difficult to have a detailed declaration among
roles in RBAC. Furthermore, with the stringent specifica-
tions such as the U.S. HIPAA and Canada PIPEDA etc.,
patients are encouraged to have the right in regulating the
access control of his EMR. In response to these problems,
we propose an EMR digital rights management system,
which is a RBAC-based extension to a matrix organization
of medical institutions, known as RBAC-Matrix. With the
aim of authorizing the EMR among roles in the organiza-
tion, RBAC-Matrix also allow patients to be involved in
defining access rights of his records. RBAC-Matrix author-
izes access control declaration among matrix organizations
of medical institutions by using XrML file in association
with each EMR. It processes XrML rights declaration file-
based authorization of behavior in the two-stage design,
called master & servant stage, thus makes the associated
EMR to be better protected. RBAC-Matrix will also make
medical record file and its associated XrML declaration to
two different EMRA(EMR Authorization)roles, namely, the
medical records Document Creator (DC) and the medical
records Document Right Setting (DRS). Access right
setting, determined by the DRS, is cosigned by the patient,
thus make the declaration of rights and the use of EMR to
comply with HIPAA specifications.
Keywords Electronic medical records .Matrix
organization . Smart card . Digital rights management
system . XrML
Introduction
With the rapid development of information technology,
EMR is likely to have medical records disclosure issues.
Some international medical records leakage happens re-
cently. In USA 2011, there is a leakage about hospitalized
Hawkeye football players. In Philippines 2009, president
Arroyo is leaked information on her breast medical check-
up. In Taiwan, artist Selina, due to severe burns in 2010,
came news that physicians of other subjects are free to
browse the medical records used his position in the medical
records privilege [1].
Such well-known facts reflect that EMR document
divulgation is overflowing and can cause serious dam-
ages. Hence the management security of EMR docu-
ments catches highly attention in these few years and it
induces the development of EMR right management
system.
Electronic medical records management system is a
management method to control the EMR documents with
security [2]. Medical organizations already practice the
methods recently to protect the medical information. But
current EMR management systems are designed according
to the traditional type of medical organization without
consideration for the latest fad or the development of
moderm medical organization.
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Ferraiolo et al. proposed the concept of role-based
access control (RBAC) [3]. But it was mostly realized only
by dichotomizing the roles of the medical into physician or
nurse, or by the formation of the linear type of organization,
i.e., classifying staff roles into the vertical top, middle and
lower levels. With the increases scale of medical staff
organization structure, access control behavior is difficult to
be declared among roles in RBAC. Furthermore, with the
stringent specifications such as the U.S. HIPAA and Canada
PIPEDA etc. [4, 5], patients are encouraged to have the
right in regulating the access control of his EMR.
In this paper, we propose an EMR digital rights manage-
ment system for matrix organization [6] known as RBAC-
Matrix. With the aim of authorizing the EMR among roles in
the matrix organization of medical institution, RBAC-Matrix
also allow patients to be involved in defining access rights of
his records. RBAC-Matrix authorizes access control decla-
ration among matrix organizations of medical institutions by
using XrML [7–9] file in association with each EMR. It
processes XrML rights declaration file-based authorization of
behavior from the two-stage design called master & servant
stages. With this design, the system can dynamic reflect the
role change within each employee and obtain a better
efficiency at the same moment.
RBAC-Matrix is based on EMRA(EMR Authorization)
role identification through a personnel server authenticated by
smartcard. RBAC-Matrix will also make medical record file
and its associated XrML declaration to two different EMRA
roles, namely, the medical records Document Creator (DC)
and the medical records Document Right Setting (DRS).
Access right setting, determined by the DRS, is cosigned by
the patient, thus make the declaration of rights and the use of
EMR to comply with HIPAA specifications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
“Related Literature” introduces the related literature. We
depicts the proposed scheme RBAC-Matrix and its
operation in “The Proposed RBAC-matrix”, then discuss
and summarize the features of RBAC-Matrix in “Summary
and Comparison”. Finally, we provide conclusions in
“Conclusion”.
Related literature
Role-based access control(RBAC)
The concept of Role-based access control first proposed
in 1992 by Ferraiolo et al. [3], be improved to a formal
role-based access control model by Sandhu et al. in 1996
[10], and finally redefined into a standard (which is called
the NIST RBAC) by the American National Standards
Institute [11].
The RBAC four elements
RBAC model, shown in Fig. 1, includes the following four
elements, User (U), Roles (R), Permissions (P), and Session
(S). The relationship between the elements outlined in the
following two points.
1. User-Role Assignment (UA)
User obtained the role of the mechanism t by
assignment, each user may be multiple roles, and each
role can be assigned to multiple users. The user
implement a particular role through the session, and the
work of a particular session is participated by multiple
roles, but each user can only play a role in a particular
session.
2. Role-Permission assignment (PA)
Mechanism grants the role related rights accordance with
the needs of different roles, and the user use the related
rights accordance with the role of identity. User can easily
transfer, add or remove roles, and rights can also be
Fig. 1 RBAC elements diagram
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transferred easily between roles, add or remove in the
maintenance of the relationship between roles and rights,
and between users and roles, making management more
simple and flexible.
Five characteristics of RBAC
(1) Least Privilege
Assigning related rights accordance with the role of
identity makes authorization simply, hence the authorization
will not cause excessive administrative burden. That is
users exercise rights accordance with the user’s role in a
particular session, to avoid abuse of rights.
(2) Separation of Duties
Against the power and responsibility conflict caused by
exclusive roles, Separation of Duties avoid the disadvantages
caused by two roles operate the same data. This are divided
into Static Separation of Duty Relations and Dynamic
Separation of Duty Relations. Static Separation of Duty
Relations is used to avoid user gets exclusive roles, such as:
a medical staff can’t have both application and review.
Dynamic Separation of Duty Relations is used to limit user
can only perform the role of a certain exclusive rights at the
same specific point in time, such as: a medical staff can’t
execute the duties of application and audit at the same time.
(3) Data Abstraction
RBAC allows enterprises to work by semantic manner,
such the actual information will be hidden in the operation and
users to classify their daily duties to replace the computer’s
low-level operation. This means use something like natural
language to describe the rights declaration provided by users
to avoid false authority arising from misunderstandings.
(4) Role Hierarchical
The relationship between roles and roles can be
hierarchical, the more upper layer role has more rights,
whereas the more layer lower role has basic rights than the
general rights, so to simplify license management, and
reduce the duplication of rights to assign work.
(5) Ease of Administration
RBAC assigns roles to the user and then digital rights to
roles for execution. The user need only adjust the role to
vary rights when change position, making the authority
setup and management more simple.
Access control structures of RABC
Two proposed access control structures of RABS are called
Roles-to-Resources access matrix(RBAC-RR for short) and
Hierarchical RBAC (H RBAC-H for short) [12, 13].
In the RBAC-RR structure, an access matrix is built to
depict the access rights between roles and resources. The
relationship between them is many to many. Each role will
have specific access rights to one or more resources. The set of
resources and the specific access rights associated with a
particular role are expected to be changed infrequently.
As for the RBAC-H structure, the access control is based
on the concept of hierarchy and inheritance. In the
proposition, assuming role r1 is said to be a descendant of
role r2, role r2 inherits all the permissions from role r1. The
rationale for H RBAC is that inheritance property greatly
simplifies the task of defining permission relationships. In
addition, it can be used in organization that there are many
users that share a set of common permissions, cutting
across many organizational levels.
States laws and regulations in personal data protection
Privacy personal information draws more and more
attention around the world. In this section, we introduce
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
Canada PIPEDA regulations and Australia HRIPA
specifications.
America-health insurance portability and accountability act
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1996, the
law against the patient’s privacy and the application of
medical information, is America’s most important medical
information law.
Privacy and Security regulations are principal kernels in
the HIPAA laws. The Privacy Regulation addresses that the
patient has the complete rights to control and understand
the use and disclosure of their medical records. However,
the consent exceptions of patient’s authorization are existed
in health business. When the patient is incapacitated, in an
emergency treatment, for the purpose of jurisdictions, or in
other possible exception situations, the covered EMRs need
to be disclosed in the practice of the medical personnel
judgment, in the best of his interests, or in life saving of the
individual. Patients also have the rights to be told the
possible exception situations and how their EMR will be
accessed when occurring.
HIPPA’s specifications in the signature scheme are as
follows [4, 14]:
(1) Patient’s understanding
For ensuring that patients have more rights to understand
how their EMR will be used and kept, digital signature
mechanism is significant to provide the services. To sign the
content of signature implies that the patient had known the
whole access rule of health information.
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(2) Patient’s control
Obtaining the permitting consent before use or disclo-
sure of PHI is one objective for patient’s control and could
be supported by digital signature system. Furthermore,
encryption techniques are easier to defend patient’s totally
control. Only patient holds key and is able to control the
authorization for decrypting EMR.
(3) Confidentiality
Encryption makes EMR unreadable for storing and
transmitting. Hence, the encryption technique is a suitable
way to keep electronic EMR secretly and prevent from
revealing without appropriate authorization.
(4) Data integrity
Guarding integrity of health data is an important duty of
health organizations, to modify or destroy health informa-
tion without patient’s authorization is prohibited. The
encryption technique and the cryptographic checksum can
be combined to provide a helpful resolution for ensuring
integrity.
(5) Consent exception
Besides the face-to-face EMR authorization of patient, to
consider the possible exceptions and solutions without
patients’ involving is also need. It can be accomplished by
the content of digital signature and the key recovery
operations.
Canada-personal information protection and electronic
documents act
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Docu-
ments Act (PIPEDA) became law on 13 April 2000 in
Canada [5].
PIPEDA is Canada’s bill relating to data privacy, which
specification organization in the course of commercial
business to collect, use and disclose personal information.
The Act contains various provisions to regulate the
electronic documents.
Relevant specifications are as follows:
(1) Accountability
An organization is responsible for personal information
under its control and shall designate an individual or
individuals who are accountable for the organization’s
compliance with the following principles.
(2) Identifying Purposes
The purposes for which personal information is collected
shall be identified by the organization at or before the time
the information is collected.
(3) Consent
The knowledge and consent of the individual are
required for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal
information, except where inappropriate.
(4) Limiting Collection
The collection of personal information shall be limited to
that which is necessary for the purposes identified by the
organization. Information shall be collected by fair and
lawful means.
(5) Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention
Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for
purposes other than those for which it was collected, except
with the consent of the individual or as required by law.
Personal information shall be retained only as long as
necessary for the fulfillment of those purposes.
(6) Accuracy
Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and
up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to
be used.
(7) Safeguards
Personal information shall be protected by security
safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information.
(8) Openness
An organization shall make readily available to individ-
uals specific information about its policies and practices
relating to the management of personal information.
(9) Individual Access
Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the
existence, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information
and shall be given access to that information. An individual
shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the
information and have it amended as appropriate.
(10) Challenging Compliance
An individual shall be able to address a challenge
concerning compliance with the above principles to the
designated individual or individuals accountable for the
organization’s compliance.
NSW-health records and information privacy act 2002
The Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (or
HRIP Act) protects the privacy of health information in
NSW [15].
The HRIP Act contains 15 health privacy principles
(HPPs) outlining how health information must be collected,
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stored, used and disclosed. The health privacy principles
can be grouped into seven main headings—collection,
storage, access & accuracy, use, disclosure, identifiers &
anonymity, and transfers & linkage. Relevant specifications
are as listed in Table 1
The proposed RBAC-matrix mechanism
RBAC-Matrix is an extension of RBAC to a matrix
organization of medical institutions, with the aim of authoriz-
ing the EMR among roles in the organization. To improve
HIPPA compliance, RBAC-Matrix also allows patients to be
involved in defining access rights of his records.
Roles in RBAC-matrix
The user who obtains the role in RBAC-Matrix is authenti-
cated by his smartcard through the personnel database server.
To distinguish the meaning of role in different situations, we
formally refer the role in RBAC-Matrix as EMRA(EMR
Authorization) role, role for short if no ambiguity.
Table 1 HRIP act outlines
Headings Principles Specifications
Collection 1. Lawful When an organization collects your health information, the information must
be collected for a lawful purpose. It must also be directly related to the
organization’s activities and necessary for that purpose.
2.Relevant The organization must ensure that your health information is relevant, accurate,
up to date and not excessive. The collection should not unreasonably intrude
into your personal affairs.
3.Direct Your health information must be collected directly from you, unless it is
unreasonable or impracticable for the organization to do so.
4.Open You must be told why your health information is being collected, what will
be done with it, and who else might see it. You must also be told how you
can see and correct your health information, and any consequences if you
decide not to provide it.
Storage 5.Secure Your health information must be stored securely, not kept any longer than
necessary, and disposed of appropriately. It should be protected from
unauthorized access, use or disclosure.
Access & Accuracy 6.Transparent The organization must provide you with details about what health information
they are storing about you, why they are storing it and what rights you
have to access it.
7.Accessible The organization must allow you to access your health information without
unreasonable delay or expense.
8.Correct The organization must allow you to update, correct or amend your health
information where necessary
9.Accurate The organization must make sure that your health information is relevant and
accurate before using it.
Use 10. Limited The organization can only use your health information for the purpose for
which it was collected, or a directly related purpose that you would expect.
Otherwise they can only use it with your consent (unless one of the
exemptions in HPP 10 applies).
Disclosure 11.Limited The organization can only disclose your health information for the purpose
for which it was collected, or a directly related purpose that you would
expect. Otherwise they can only disclose it with your consent (unless one
of the exemptions in HPP 11 applies).
Identifiers & Anonymity 12.Not identified An organization can only give you an identification number if it is reasonably
necessary to carry out their functions efficiently.
13.Anonymous You are entitled to receive health services anonymously, where this is lawful
and practicable.
Transfers & Linkage 14.Controlled Your health information can only be transferred outside New South Wales in
accordance with HPP 14.
15.Authorised Your health information can only be included in a system to link health records
across more than one organization if you expressly consent to this.
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There are defined three abstract roles (i.e., DC, DRS, and
DU roles) and two databases (i.e., PD and RD), and two
server (i.e., RS and DS) in RBAC-Matrix. The functions
and corresponding relationships among roles and characters
of medical institution as shown below in Fig. 2:
(1) Document Creator (DC) is the one who creates EMR
content, which is usually initiated by character of
Registration Department (RD) and performed by the
Attending Doctor and the specific treatment of the
relevant Lab. test content. Document Right Setting
(DRS) denotes the one who authorized the document
rights, which is performed by Attending Doctor (AD)
and approved by the patient. Document User(DU) is
the person wants to use the EMR.
(2) The Right Server(RS) has two databases, personnel
database(PD), and right database (RD). The personnel
database keeps all patient’s data and the department
and level of all medical personnel. The RD keeps all
the document right of the electric medical records.
(3) Document Server(DS) stores all encrypted EMRs.
Smartcard-based authentication
Smartcards are issued to the medical personnel, and
patients, which is used as the personal certificate to identify
the user’s identity in the system. It must present the
certificate at any operation stage. There are recorded
medical personnel ID(Did), a public key of the medical
personnel (EKDid), and a private key of the medical
personnel (DKDid) in the medical personnel card. There is
recorded patient ID (Pid), a public key of the patient
(EKPid), and a private key of the patient (DKPid) in the
patient card.
The personnel database in the RS records all other data,
such as the roles, the working departments and level for each
medical personnel. With this kind of design can eliminate the
action for updating whenever there is a change.
Matrix organization classification
In medical institutes, medical personnel are organized into
different departments according their specialized fields, e.g.,
Cardiology, InternalMedical and Dermatology. Also, there are
some special projects that perform task force treatment.
Finally, exception handling team deals with the exception
handling of EMR when emergency. These classifications
define the basis for the access rights setting to be referred. For
each organization, there is also a security clearance level
which corresponds to characters in medical institution, e.g.,
Intern, Resident, Chief doctor, Doctor in Charge, and so forth,
for the EMR to be accessed.
EMR access rights
Each EMR has a corresponding EMR access rights
description which describes for which users what permis-
sions. Permissions are formed by the patient and the
Attending Doctor and both have the right to control all
authorization. Usually, the authorization process is through
the Attending Doctor. However, this authorization, which
must go through the patients’ understanding and agree, is
cosigned by the patient, thus improve the patient’s
understanding and patient control features in HIPPA.
Each access rights description should include the
exception handling team in case of the patient in uncon-
scious, the legal factor, or other possible exceptions. The
exception handling team comprise of senior staff, e.g. Chief
Information Officer and the Superintendent.
The proposed EMR access rights is done by using XrML
[7, 8] file description, which depicts the EMR’s permissions
for which characters can record what permissions (read, print,
filling). The EMR can only be added comment, can’t be edited
or deleted to prevent the past medical records to be modified,
so that the authorized rights are read, print, or comment.
It will be packaged as Document Usage License with other
information and stored in the right database(RD) after DRS
Fig. 2 RBAC-Matrix in the
three operating roles and the
two servers
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upload the XrML document right. If requested, the document
server (DS) will produce shorter XrML document right
attached only to medical personnel ID for each document
user(DU), according to the XrML right description.
Example of XrML document right, shown in Fig. 3, as
follows: first, exception handling by characters in exception
handle team, then (1) The medical personnel of the
Cardiology Department at level 3 or above, Dermatology
<license> 
 <grant> 
  <ExceptionHandle> Exception Handle team </ExceptionHandle>  
<cx:read> 
<department> Cardiology </department> <level>3</level> 
<department>Dermatology</department> <level>5</level> 
<department>Dentistry</department> <level>1</level> 
<department>Nephrology</department> <level>3</level> 
<project> Top Hill</project><level>5</level> 
</cx:read> 
<cx:print> 
<department>Cardiology</department> <level>3</level> 
<department>Dermatology</department> <level>5</level> 
<department>Nephrology</department> <level>3</level> 
</cx:print> 
<cx:comment> 
<department>Cardiology</department> <level>3</level> 
</cx:comment> 
<offline>yes</offline> 
<validityUntil>2011-07-13</validatyUntil> 
<emrResource> 
  <docID>P0001</docID> 
</emrResource> 
</grant> 
<issuer> 
   <CoSignature> 
        <!---Signature of DRS-Attending Doctor-- > 
        <!---Signature of Patients 
   </CoSignature> 
</issuer> 
</license> 
Fig. 3 Example of XrML Doc-
ument Right
Fig. 4 Document upload and Right declaration
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Fig. 5 Working tables for Document Right
Fig. 6 Document download and
Usage
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Department at level 5 or above, the first layer of the
Dentistry department, the Nephrology department at level 3
or above, and Special project Top Hill can do read to the
document. (2) The medical personnel of the Cardiology
Department at level 3 or above, Dermatology Department at
level 5 or above, and the Nephrology department at level 3
or above, can do print to the document. (3) The medical
personnel of the Cardiology Department at level 3 or above
can do comment to the document.
Three operation phases
RBAC-Matrix mechanism can be divided into three
operation phases, namely “Document upload and Right
declaration”, “Document download and Usage” and “Doc-
ument Execution”.
Document upload and right declaration
Within this phase, EMR content and associated XrML
access rights are created and upload to DS and RS, shown
in Fig. 4. Steps as follows:
(1) EMR record(called, Doc) is initiated by staff in the
Registration department of medical institution, filled
with Medical Examination and Diagnosis, performed
by Document Creator(DC). The Doc is then sent to
Document Right Setting(DRS) for authorization.
(2) DRS(the Attending Doctor) authorizes his underly-
ing medical personnel rights according to the
situation in the patient, and the contents of this
authorization have to go through the patient’s
understand and agree by means of a cosign by the
patient. The DRS sets the corresponding access
right and produces a complete XrML rights descrip-
tion file. And then send his certificate(in his
smartcard), Doc, XrML right file, and signatures of
DRS and the patient to Right Server(RS).
(3) RS verifies the certificate of DRS through the
personnel database(PD).
(4) RS generates the corresponding document file number
(fid) for the Doc.
(5) RS produces the first random key element of A, for the
encryption taken in the DS.
(6) RS also transfers the complete XrML document
right into working tables to speed up the services
of the RS query, shown in Fig. 5, and stores the fid
and the first key element A into the Right Database
(RD).
(7) RS transfers documents, fid, and random element of A
to document server (DS).
(8) DS generating the second random elements of B after
receives the above information.
(9) DS calculate the document encryption key(sk=A⊕B).
(10) DS encrypts the document (Docfid) into encrypted
document (Efid) through this key.
(11) DS store random element B, encrypted document
(Efid), and the fid in the DS.
Fig. 8 Document execution phase
<license> 
 <grant> 
   <keyHolder> E0005 </keyHolder>  
<cx:read/> 
<cx:print/> 
<offline>yes</offline> 
<RandomA>BFA56DEACB123F443ABAC11ABA24</RandomA> 
<validityUntil>2011-07-13</validatyUntil> 
<digitalResource> 
        <docID>P0001</docID> 
</digitalResource> 
</grant> 
<issuer> 
   <dsig:Signature> 
       <!---Signature of RS > 
   </dsig:Signature> 
</issuer> 
</license> 
Fig. 7 The shorter XrML docu-
ment right for DU
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Document download and usage
When a Document User(DU) wants to download the EMR,
i.e., Doc, RS checks the DU’s character and issues
appropriate actions when the DU’s character pass the
document right setting, shown in Fig. 6. Details as follows:
(1) Document User(DU) sends the certificate from his
smartcard and download request which contains a
medical record number(fid) to the RS.
(2) RS verifies the certificate and obtains the user’s
character of medical institution through the personnel
database (PD).
(3) RS Verifies the legitimacy of the user in accordance
with the XrML description associated with the fid.
(4) RS produces a shorter XrML document right, signed
by the RS, accordance with the user’s authorization in
this document, shown in Fig. 7. The shorter XrML
document right records only the user’s authorization in
the corresponding document. This document right
contains file number, the medical personnel ID, the
medical personnel’s authorization to use the document
file (such as read, comment, and print),valid date,
whether off-line work, and the first random element A.
(5) RS sends this shorter XrML document right and its
signature value to DU.
(6) RS sends a download request and the address of the
user’s computer to DS.
(7) DS searches the corresponding encrypted document and
the second random key elementB in accordance with fid.
(8) DS sends the second random key element of B,
encrypted by user’s public key, the encrypted docu-
ment, and its signature value to DU.
Document execution
This phase describes how to access downloaded EMR, i.e.,
Doc, after the previous phase. Details as follows, shown in
Fig. 8:
(1) User’s application checks whether the encrypted docu-
ment and the corresponding Right’fid exist in temporary
database. If not, back to the download phase.
(2) The application gets the first key element A from
Right’fid.
(3) The application gets the second key element B by its
own private key.
(4) The application calculates the file encryption key
(sk = A ⊕ B).
(5) The application decrypts the encrypted documents by
the encryption key and access the EMR in accordance
with the document right.
This phase can provide offline function, if Right’fid
permitted. All online files will be deleted and offline files
will backup in the user’s computer when the DU leave.
Security discussion
These three operating phases mentioned above is
executed with assumption of a control environment,
naming inside the medical institution, where server site
and communication channel is well recognized and
protected. As for a complex environment, some mech-
anisms [16] to do mutual authentication must be estab-
lished before to make a secure communication channel.
Following we will discuss others security issues within
these operating phases:
Table 2 RBAC-matrix key
elements summary Fields RBAC-Matrix
Authentication SmartCard-based
Document right setting XrML setting by DRS(i.e.,Patient and Attending Doctor)
Mechanism roles Three roles, two servers, and two databases.
Organization type Matrix organization
Key combination Two random elements A and B
Document right XrML with two stages
Off-line operation Can be set
Table 3 Comparison characters
among RBAC access control
structures
Fields/structures RBAC-RR RBAC-H RBAC-Matrix
Role access structures Individual Hierarchy Matrix
Access rights inherence None Vertical upwards Vertical upwards and horizontal spreadable
Access rights setting Statics Statics Dynamic
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In the Document upload and Right declaration phase, all
the operating roles are authenticated by the smartcard. The
complete EMR record (Doc) is recognized and signed by
the Attending Doctor(in fact private key in the AD’s
smartcard), and the associated XrML file is cosigned by
the patient. The file is encrypted by a strong encryption
algorithm like AES [17] to be well protected.
In the Document download and Usage phase, the DC is
authenticated by the smartcard. After that, the DS encrypts
the random key element B with DC’s public key.
In the Document Execution phase, the application gets
the key element A from Rightfid and decrypts the key
element B by using user’s private key. Then perform the
access right according to the file Rightfid.
All these operating can be secured if the authentication
through smartcard and operating like encryption/decryption
algorithm are secured.
Summary and comparison
RABC-Matrix provides a way to realize both the security
issues: authentication, confidentiality, and availability, and the
EMR’s access control and digital right setting. In our scheme,
users are authenticated through smartcard authentication to
check for users’ characters in the Medial Institution and do
indirect mutual authentication. For the EMR’s access control,
we implement the access control structure in a matrix from
and specify the rights in an associated XrML file. The XrML
document rights is performed at two stages, i.e., the master
stage(complete XrML rights file created in phase2) and the
servant stage(shorter XrML rights file served for phase 3).
Since the shorter XrML document right which contents only
the medical personnel ID for each user, the user’s application
can easily authenticate the EMR usage through the user’s
smartcard. Besides, we generate the key with two random key
elements A and B, stored in different databases, and encrypt
all EMR records. Thus, we can obtain availability and reduce
the potential risk of leakage.
For modern Medical Institution organizations, either the
dichotomized (hierarchical) roles or roles of linear type are
not sufficient to overcome the access control issues [18]. In
RBAC-Matrix, we propose three views of the organiza-
tions, i.e., the departments, the projects, and the emergency
handles. Within each views of the structure, we also assign
a security clearance level to each character. Detailed
operations within RBAC-Matrix are carried through the
three roles(DC, DRS, and DU), the two servers(RS and
DS), and the two database(PD, RD). Table 2 summarizes
the key elements of RBAC-Matrix. The comparison
characters of the previous proposed access control struc-
tures: RBAC-RR, RBAC-H, and proposed RBAC-Matrix
are depicted in Table 3.
Conclusion
We propose the RBAC-Matrix digital rights management
system, which is a RBAC-based extension to a matrix
organization of Medical Institutions. RBAC-Matrix
authorizes access control declaration among matrix
organizations of medical institutions by using XrML file
in association with each EMR. It transfers and processes
XrML document rights files within the master & servant
stages, thus makes better protection on the associated
EMR file.
RBAC-Matrix will also make medical record file and its
associated XrML declaration to two different EMRA(EMR
Authorization)roles, namely, the medical records Document
Creator (DC) and the medical records Document Right
Setting (DRS). In associated with each EMR, the DRS set
the access rights by constructing XrML rights file and sign
it. That XrML rights file is cosigned by patients, thus maks
the declaration of rights and the use of EMR to comply
with HIPAA specifications
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